

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
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
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15	D/PAO				
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19	C/ACIS		X		
20	D/SOVA		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
22	NIO/USSR		X		
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Remarks This copy received from Senator McClure.

Executive Secretary  
15 Oct 85

Date

STAT



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

October 4, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to share the strong concern you expressed to us on June 10, 1985 about the military implications of the Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations. I agree with your resolve to respond to the expanding pattern of Soviet violations. I strongly urge you to raise yet again the 32 Presidentially reported or confirmed Soviet violations with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at the November 19, 1985 Geneva Summit Meeting. Until the Soviets admit and reverse their SALT violations, full U.S. compliance with existing arms control treaties only undermines the security of America.

Attached for public reference is a comprehensive list of 32 Soviet SALT and other arms control treaty violations which you have reported or confirmed in the three reports you have sent to Congress, together with a list of 22 additional Soviet violations or circumventions reported in the press.

## Proportionate Responses

As you correctly pointed out in your June 10, 1985 statement to Congress on interim restraint, "proportionate responses" to these Soviet violations are necessary, and Congress responded by authorizing such proportionate responses in the FY 1986 Defense Authorization Bill.

I am anxiously awaiting the study that you directed the Defense Department to prepare, the "Response to Soviet Violations Paper," due to you by November 15, 1985. Because you have announced that you intend to make this study part of your FY 1987 Defense Budget request to Congress in January, 1986, I request consultation on the results of the "RSVP" study effort, as well as an advance copy of a summary of its most important conclusions as soon as you can make it available to Congress.

As you correctly stated to Congress on June 10, continued U.S. SALT II compliance and progress in arms control requires that "the Soviet Union take the positive, concrete steps to correct its non-compliance... and reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted

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military buildup." The impending Geneva U.S.-Soviet Summit may be the Soviets' last chance, and your best opportunity to remind the Soviet leadership of the necessity of reversing their arms control breaches.

As your own National Security Advisor stated on June 10,: "There can not be a future regime of arms control without compliance." He added that "If arms control by extraordinary Soviet violations were to lose its meaning, we would have to build more systems clearly." I strongly urge you to invoke supreme U.S. national security interests to proportionately respond to the Soviet violations, even if these U.S. responses would violate provisions of arms control treaties. As your own National Security Advisor also stated on June 10, "Non-compliance does entail costs."

The Soviets have gained their main objective of strategic superiority over the U.S. through their SALT Break Out violations, and thus they will be very reluctant to correct these violations. Indeed, deliberate Soviet efforts to counter U.S. National Technical Means of verification strongly indicate a Soviet intention to persevere in their violations.

#### MX and SDI Cutbacks

I note with grave concern the recent Congressionally imposed cutbacks in your Strategic Defense Initiative and in MX deployment, but I am especially alarmed with Defense Secretary Weinberger's recent agreement to stop MX deployment at no more than 50 ICBMs in existing Minuteman silos and not seek further MX deployment funds in the FY 1987 Defense Budget now in preparation at the Pentagon. This will delay the already long-delayed MX program another year, for no good reason, and we may not get even 100 MXs until after 1989, if then. Even the Carter Administration planned 200 survivable MX ICBMs, to be operational by early 1986. And as your June 10 Report to Congress stated: "... the integrity of the U.S. strategic modernization program must be maintained."

I believe that currently planned strategic force cutbacks go in precisely the opposite direction, especially at a time when the top Soviet leader is describing the international situation as "explosive." As your National Security Advisor stated on June 10, we should be "accelerating and adding to the U.S. strategic modernization program," in light of the Soviet violations.

Finally, I am reassured by your National Security Advisor's statement that you will "reach some decisions based on the [Defense] Secretary's report to [the President] in November.

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These would probably be reflected in the [FY 1987 Defense] budget submission in January."

Arms Control Compliance Supplemental


I urge you to assemble all of your proportional response options to the Soviet violations in a FY 1986 Arms Control Compliance Supplemental Defense Request, so that both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress can honestly assess the threats and requirements posed by the Soviet SALT Break Out violations in one package, unencumbered by other defense or budgetary considerations.

As your National Security Advisor stated on June 10, the Soviets must "get back in compliance, or you can expect compensating measures to be taken ... we will take action to account for what they've already done in violation."

Your Legacy

I believe that your legacy should be that of the Leader who has tried to restore American strength, power, and moral authority. The people who gave you a landslide victory in both 1980 and 1984 gave you that mandate on the basis of this commitment. We urge you to continue to make this your legacy.

Respectfully,



James A. McClure  
United States Senator

Attachment: Soviet Arms Control Violations

Copies to:

Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, JCS  
Director, CIA  
Director, ACDA

In addition to addressing the military implications of the Soviet SALT violations and deceptions, we need to summarize these Presidentially confirmed Soviet arms control treaty violations.\* Moreover, when these violations were first released, they were downplayed by both the White House and by the media, so they are not in fact well-known at all. It is important to note further that these are the unanimously agreed findings of the national security departments and agencies of our government. There were no dissenting footnotes nor disagreeing qualifications by any part of the Executive Branch to these Presidential Reports to Congress. There are now 32 Soviet arms control treaty violations agreed and confirmed by the Executive Branch, and reported by the President to the Congress.

These 32 violations are summarized, for the first time aggregated in one place publicly, as follows according to the different treaties violated.

32 Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations Confirmed and Agreed Within the Reagan Administration

BOX: 11 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1979 SALT II Treaty

1. Soviet buildup of over 378 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) above the 2504 level of Soviet SNDVs as of June, 1979;
2. Soviet failure to deactivate over 632 SNDVs down to the 2,250 SALT II SNDV level;
3. Soviet development and operational deployment at over 20 bases of an initial increment of 200 launchers for the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" ICBM;
4. The Re-entry Vehicle of the SS-25 is less than one half the total missile Throw-Weight, constituting covert MIRVing with a 3 MIRV capability;
5. The Soviet SS-NX-23 SLBM constitutes a prohibited heavy new SLBM;
6. Soviet production of more than 30 Backfire bombers per year-- over 14 extra, illegal Backfire bombers, or several illegal Backfire squadrons--constitutes a Soviet violation of Brezhnev's Backfire bomber production pledge, which former President Carter told the Senate was an integral part of the SALT II Treaty;
7. Arctic basing of Backfire bombers, increasing their range, another violation of Brezhnev's Backfire bomber pledge;
8. Probably equipping Backfire bombers with a refueling probe, also contrary to Brezhnev's Backfire pledge, increasing Backfire's range illegally;
9. Soviet deliberate interference with US National Technical Means of verification, by a continuously expanding pattern of strategic Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception;
10. Almost total encryption of all new Soviet missile testing telemetry;
11. Probable Soviet deployment of 200 banned SS-16 mobile ICBMs.

These Soviet SALT II violations have enormous strategic significance, both military and political. Altogether, they amount to Soviet strategic offensive superiority. First, they result in about 632 more Soviet SNDVs than are allowed by SALT II. Second, they

augment the already overwhelming Soviet first strike capability actually codified with US agreement in the terms of the SALT II Treaty itself. Even more importantly, US unilateral compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty which the Soviets are confirmed to be violating at will actually demonstrates Soviet strategic offensive superiority to the world. If the numbers themselves did not demonstrate Soviet superiority, then overt US agreement to unequal levels of forces in complying contrary to its own laws and Constitution with an unratified SALT II Treaty clearly demonstrates US acquiescence to Soviet superiority. And the Soviets are estimated to be preparing to deploy over 700 more mobile ICBM launchers by 1987 in addition to their already overwhelming 6 to 1 superiority in ICBM warhead capabilities. The Soviets are already thus 10 to 15 years ahead of the US in strategic offensive capabilities.

BOX: 7 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1972 SALT I ABM Treaty

12. The siting, orientation, and capabilities of the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM Battle Management radar violate 3 provisions of the SALT I ABM Treaty;
13. ABM-mode tests of Soviet Surface-to-Air-Missiles and radars are highly probable violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty;
14. The Soviets may be developing and deploying a territorial, nationwide ABM defense, which would violate the SALT I ABM Treaty ban on developing even a base for a nationwide ABM defense;
15. Mobility of the ABM-3 system is a potential violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty, which bans mobile ABMs;
16. Soviet rapid relocation without prior notification of a "Flat Twin" ABM-3 mobile radar, creating the Kamchatka ABM test range, was a violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty;
17. Confirmed Soviet falsification of their dismantling of excess ABM test range launchers in 1974, which violated the 1974 SALT I ABM Treaty dismantling procedures
18. Soviet deliberate concealment activities impede verification in violation of the SALT I ABM Treaty.

These Soviet violations of the SALT I ABM Treaty have enormous significance, both military and political. The Soviets are planning to deploy over 3,000 mobile ABM interceptors by 1987, for a nationwide ABM defense. They can already defend almost 20% of their strategic forces, and soon they will be able to defend 50 to 66%. The Soviets are over 10 years ahead of the US in strategic defenses.

BOX: 4 Presidentially Confirmed Soviet Violations of the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons

19. Soviet deployment of the Heavy SS-19 ICBM and the Medium SS-17 ICBM to replace the Light SS-11 ICBM was a circumvention defeating the object and purpose of the SALT I Interim Agreement; this violation alone increased the Soviet counterforce threat by a factor of 6 and was as significant a setback for US national security as the loss of the Viet Nam War itself through Communist violation of the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement;

20. Soviet deployment of modern submarines exceeding the limit of 740 SLBM launchers without dismantling other ICBM or SLBM launchers, which the Soviets actually admitted, violated the SALT I Interim Agreement; it actually took the Soviets until 1981, five years after the SALT I Interim Agreement expired, to deactivate all 209 SS-7/8s required;  
21. Soviet deliberate Camouflage, Concealment and Deception activities impeded verification, in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement;  
22. Implied circumvention of the 1974 SALT I submarine dismantling procedures, through deployment of long-range, supersonic SLCMs on Stretch Y Class submarines.

BOX : Presidential Confirmation of Manifold Soviet Nuclear Test Ban Violations

23. The 1958-1961 Nuclear Test Moratorium

The Soviets breached a unilateral commitment by engaging in atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in August, 1961;

24. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963

The Soviets violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty by extra-territorial venting of radioactive nuclear debris from underground nuclear weapons tests; (There have been over 30 conclusively confirmed Soviet extraterritorial ventings, and hundreds of other probable and likely violations.)

25. The 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty

The US Government has determined that the Soviet Union is likely to have violated the underground nuclear testing yield limit (150 kilotons) of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (See chart. There have now been well over 16 Soviet high yield tests violating the TTBT. )

The many Soviet nuclear test ban violations have allowed the Soviets to develop and test much more lethal warheads for their new ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles. Thus, these Soviet violations have enormous strategic significance.


BOX: Presidential Confirmation of Soviet Violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement on Cuba of 1962

26. The Soviets breached a unilateral commitment by sending offensive weapons--intercontinental nuclear-delivery capable bombers, nuclear-delivery capable fighter-bombers, and various kinds of nuclear missile submarines--back to Cuba, beginning in 1969.

On September 14, 1983, President Reagan for a second time confirmed that the Soviet Union had violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement which ended the Cuban Missile Crisis : " That agreement has been abrogated many times by the Soviet Union and Cuba in the bringing of what can only be described as offensive weapons, not defensive, there." This Presidential statement has been backed up by the CIA Director, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Even the State Department concedes that the Soviets have violated the "spirit" of the Agreement.

BOX: Other Soviet Arms Control Treaty Violations Confirmed by the President

27. The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons





The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons by the prohibited first use in war of chemical weapons in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan.

28. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating the Biological Weapons Convention by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and capabilities.

29. The Conventional Weapons Convention

The Soviets violated the Conventional Weapons Convention by using booby-trap mines and incendiary devices against civilians in Afghanistan.

30. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act

The United States Government has determined that the Soviet Union is violating the Helsinki Final Act by its inadequate notifications of its Warsaw Pact military exercises.

31. The Montreux Convention of 1936

The Soviets violated the Montreux Convention by transiting the Turkish Straits repeatedly with aircraft carriers. (The Greek Government, a signatory of the Montreux Convention, repeatedly protested these violations to the Soviets, to no avail.)

32. The 1982 Brezhnev SS-20 Moratorium

The Soviets breached their unilateral commitment to end SS-20 deployment by completing SS-20 launcher positions and continuing to deploy new SS-20s.

In sum, 11 of the 32 Presidentially confirmed Soviet violations relate to the SALT II Treaty, 7 relate to the SALT I ABM Treaty, and 4 relate to the SALT I Interim Agreement. Many relate to the nuclear weapons test ban agreements.

\*There have been three Presidential violations reports:

January 23, 1984;

October 10, 1984 -- The "GAC Report"; and

February 1, 1985.

There are six considerations which support the fact that the GAC Report is an authoritative Presidential Report:

1. The President requested it in 1982;
2. The President has embraced it publicly on June 14, 1984;
3. The GAC Report largely overlaps the January 23, 1984 report;
4. The GAC Report was reviewed within the Government;
5. Most of the GAC Report's conclusions are identical to those of the President's January 23, 1984 Report;
6. The President's National Security Advisor himself has

BOX: 6 Other Reagan Administration Charges of Soviet Treaty Violations

1. Soviet violation of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, by denying free elections in Poland;
2. Soviet violation of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, by occupying Eastern Europe;
3. Soviet violation of the United Nations Charter, through threatened aggression against Poland in 1980-1981;
4. Soviet violation of the Paris Peace Accords on ending the Indochina War, by continuing to buildup the North Vietnamese military;
5. Soviet violation of various international agreements governing civil aviation, by the brutal KAL-007 shoot-down murder incident of 1983;
6. Soviet violation of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement during the attempts to recover the KAL-007 "Black Box". In fact, there is strong evidence that the Soviets shot down KAL-007 in the first place in order to cover-up some of their SALT II violations ( such as a test of their illegal SS-25 second new type ICBM with full encryption of electronic telemetry signals ) planned for that very night of 31 August-1 September 1983.

The Defense department has stated that: " The US should vigorously pursue compliance issues with the Soviet Union and demand that the Soviets take corrective action when we detect violations. If this fails, the US should be prepared to take those measures necessary to maintain our national security in the face of Soviet violations."

But the Soviets are directly challenging the essence of the US democratic political system by their 32 confirmed, conclusive agreed, arms control violations. They are boldly gambling that American democratic leaders can not muster the leadership or collect the bipartisan political consensus necessary to demonstrate the political will to compensate for the Soviet SALT violations. The Soviets believe, with some justification derived from their direct experience with American cowardice and appeasement, that American political leaders are paralyzed and demoralized and unable to galvanize public support to challenge them and counteract their threats to our collective allied security.

The Soviets are already quite self-confident, and have reason to be. The Soviets know full well that they have an overwhelming 4 to 1 numerical advantage in ICBM warheads (counting DIA's best estimate of 14 warheads on each of 326 super heavy SS-18 ICBMs, giving the Soviets 8,500 ICBM warheads to only 2,100 for the US ), and their accuracy and megatonnage advantages give them over a 6 to 1 or even an 8 to 1 advantage in first strike, counterforce capabilities. The Soviets also have simultaneously over a 14 to 1 advantage in Intermediate Range Nuclear Force warheads against NATO. The Soviets are also deploying a nationwide ABM defense , capable soon of defending not only Moscow, but also ICBM fields and the whole nation. Thus the Soviets are able to threaten the US with a strategic offensive first strike, and soon they will even be largely immune from a limited US retaliation.

BOX: 22 Additional Soviet SALT Circumventions or Violations

Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has testified to the Senate that the existing violations reports from the President are "illustrative only", and that "twenty to twenty-five" more Soviet violations remain to be publicly confirmed by the President to the Congress. The following 22 additional Soviet SALT violations have been widely discussed in the press.

1. Deploying 12 to 14 warheads on each SS-18 ICBM, when SALT II allows only 10, increasing the Soviet ICBM warhead total by over 1,200; The latest NIE reportedly reaches this conclusion.
2. Developing and testing the Soviet SS-18 ICBM rapid-reload and refire capability as a circumvention of all the SALT II ceilings, doubling the Soviet SS-18 force;
3. Soviet testing of an ABM rapid-reload and refire capability prohibited by the SALT I ABM Treaty;
4. Soviet failure to dismantle 18 SS-9 Fractional Orbital Bombardment ICBMs banned by the SALT II Treaty, which also circumvented the SALT I ICBM ceiling;
5. Soviet deployment of SS-11 ICBMs at SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM soft launch pads for covert soft launch in circumvention of all SALT I and SALT II ceilings;
6. Soviet maintenance of several thousand stockpiled ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic cruise missiles as potentially operational, thus circumventing all SALT II ceilings;
7. Soviet development and deployment of the SS-24 rail mobile ICBM, which will be above SALT II launcher ceilings, and which reportedly may have heavier throwweight than the Soviet heavy SS-19, and which therefore is a prohibited new very heavy ICBM;
8. Probable Soviet exceeding of the SALT II ceiling of 820 MIRVed ICBMs, by reportedly deploying covertly MIRVed mobile SS-25 ICBMs, and by preparations to deploy MIRVed SS-24 mobile ICBMs;
9. Soviet failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, in violation of the SALT I ICBM ceilings and 1974 dismantling procedures, and continuous falsification of official deactivation reports between 1975 and 1981;
10. Ongoing Soviet deployment of the mobile SS-16, mobile SS-24, and mobile SS-25 ICBMs, which circumvents and defeats the object and purpose of SALT I, because it is inconsistent with the US SALT I Unilateral Statement against mobile ICBM deployment.
11. Reported Soviet deployment of operational SS-25 mobile ICBMs using old SS-7 ICBM support facilities at the Yurya old SS-7 complex, which violates the SALT I dismantling procedures for old SS-7 ICBMs.
12. Violation of the late Soviet President Brezhnev's 1972 SALT I pledge not to build mobile ICBMs.
13. Violation of the late Soviet President Brezhnev's 1972 SALT I pledge to dismantle the entire G Class of strategic missile submarines.
14. Soviet violation of the SALT II ceilings of 1200 MIRV ICBM and MIRV SLBMs, and the 1320 ceiling on MIRV launchers and intercontinental bombers with long-range ALCMs, through deployment of excess MIRVed ICBM and MIRVed SLBMs and over 50 Bear H bombers and over 250 intercontinental Backfire bombers capable of carrying long-range ALCMs.

15. Soviet circumvention of the SALT I ABM Treaty, by giving the Moscow ABM-3 complex the capability to defend over 300 adjacent MIRVed ICBM silos.
16. Soviet violation of the 1971 Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, by jamming US early warning detection systems, failing to notify the US of this jamming, and failing to notify the US of the early April 1984 salvo launch of multiple SS-20s toward the US.
17. Soviet flight-testing of their new mobile ICBM launchers continuously concealed by camouflage, thereby violating the SALT II provision that the US must be able to determine the relationship between a new missile and its launcher.
18. Soviet achievement of "unilateral advantages" through their circumventions, violations and negotiating deceptions related to SALT I and II. These Soviet unilateral advantages violate the 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations, which is specified in the Preamble to the SALT II Treaty as a fundamental element of SALT II.
19. Soviet violation of the June 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, through their hostile actions and hostile threats in the October 1973 Middle East War. ( The Federal Republic of Germany has made this charge against the Soviets.)
20. Soviet direct interference with US National Technical Means of SALT verification, in a reported 1980 incident in which Soviet electronic warfare technology actually took control of a US intelligence satellite, actually rendering it useless during a key Soviet missile test. The incident is a clear violation of SALT I and II provisions. Moreover, the Soviets have reportedly blinded US satellites with lasers, and are jamming US electronic collection satellites and other systems.
21. SALT II permits no increase in the throwweight of the super heavy SS-18 ICBM, and no new type of very heavy ICBM to replace it. The Soviets appear to be doing both: developing a 3rd new type ICBM which is even heavier the SS-18.
22. Any follow-on to the heavy SS-24 will have to be within 5% of its throwweight and other characteristics, or else it is a prohibited new type ICBM. The SS-24 follow-on under development is a 4th new type ICBM, when SALT II allows only one new type ICBM, and the SS-24 follow-on also appears to have even more throwweight than the heavy SS-24, which is already probably heavier than the SS-19.

The Soviets have thus gained overwhelming strategic superiority over the US through their SALT violations and thus they will be very reluctant to correct their violations. Indeed, deliberate Soviet efforts to counter US National Technical Means of verification strongly indicate a Soviet intention to persevere in circumventing and violating treaties.